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In theory, an unwanted thing or condition can be eradicated by 
the negative means of attacking it directly or the positive means of 
nurturing a nemesis, or a combination of the two.  In the field of pest 
control, for example, a given pest can be attacked directly with pesti-
cides, or a nemesis species can be introduced into the environment.  
In the latter case, the nemesis species does the work of extermination 
either by attacking the pest or by outcompeting it for food and other 
resources.1  In the field of antislavery, both approaches may be found 
in the law developed under the Thirteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.2  On the one hand, various statutes take the nega-
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1 ROY G. VAN DRIESCHE & THOMAS S. BELLOWS, JR., BIOLOGICAL CONTROL 6-7 (1996). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  
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tive approach of prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude direct-
ly.3  This method may be stated as granting a right—namely, the “right 
to be free from involuntary servitude”4—but the focus remains on the 
condition to be negated, “involuntary servitude.”  Because this me-
thod centers on the direct prohibition of slavery and involuntary servi-
tude, I call it the “prohibition approach.” 
The United States Supreme Court has read the Thirteenth 
Amendment to mandate a positive strategy as well.  Pollock v. Williams,5 
decided in 1944, crowned a series of rulings in which the Court struck 
down various southern state laws that established debt peonage under 
the guise of punishing workers for fraudulent borrowing.  Pollock had 
accepted a loan of five dollars in exchange for his promise to repay 
the money through labor.6  When he quit work before completing re-
payment, he was convicted of “[o]btaining property by fraudulent 
promise to perform labor or service.”7  The Court’s opinion, penned 
by Justice Robert Jackson, set forth a free labor interpretation of the 
Amendment.  Jackson observed that the Amendment aimed not only at 
ending slavery, but also at “maintain[ing] a system of completely free 
and voluntary labor throughout the United States.”8  He then explained 
why the state could not criminalize the quitting of work without violat-
ing the Amendment and the Peonage Act passed under its authority: 
3 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2006), mandates the criminal punishment of 
“[w]hoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any con-
dition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term.”  Section 1584 is one of 
the building blocks of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA).  See, e.g., TVPA, 
Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 112(a)(1)(A), 114 Stat. 1466, 1486 (2000) (codified in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C.) (doubling the maximum prison sentence for violations of 
§ 1584).  Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 241 forbids conspiracies to interfere with rights secured 
“by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”  In the words of the Court, this lan-
guage “incorporates the prohibition of involuntary servitude contained in the Thir-
teenth Amendment.”  United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 940 (1988).  
4 Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934, 936.  
5 322 U.S. 4 (1944). 
6 Id. at 6. 
7 Id. at 5 n.1. 
8 Id. at 17; see also Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (noting the 
Amendment’s purpose “to safeguard the freedom of labor upon which alone can en-
during prosperity be based”).  These judicial statements echo similar assertions by the 
Amendment’s framers.  See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202-03 (1864) (State-
ment of Sen. Wilson); id. at 1313 (Statement of Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1369 (Statement 
of Sen. Clark); id. at 1439 (Statement of Sen. Harlan); id. at 1459-60 (Statement of 
Sen. Henderson); id. at 2615 (Statement of Rep. Morris); id. at 2979 (Statement of 
Rep. Farnsworth); id. at 2990 (Statement of Rep. Ingersoll).   
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[I]n general the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working condi-
tions, or treatment is the right to change employers.  When the master 
can compel and the laborer cannot escape the obligation to go on, there 
is no power below to redress and no incentive above to relieve a harsh 
overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.  Resulting depression of 
working conditions and living standards affects not only the laborer under 
the system, but every other with whom his labor comes in competition.
9
 
On this view, the free labor system operates as a nemesis to slavery 
and involuntary servitude.  By exercising their Thirteenth Amend-
ment right to change employers, workers exert the “power below” ne-
cessary to give employers the “incentive above” to avoid slavery and 
servitude.  The right at issue is formulated positively as “the right to 
change employers,” not negatively, as “the right to be free from invo-
luntary servitude.”  On the logic of this approach, the Amendment 
protects not only rights that, by their absence, define the conditions of 
slavery and involuntary servitude, but also all rights necessary to pro-
vide workers with the “power below” and employers the “incentive 
above” to prevent those conditions.10  A worker may be free to quit, for 
example, but if she does not also enjoy the right to change employers, 
then she cannot be considered free.11  Because this approach centers 
on nurturing the free labor system as a nemesis to slavery and involun-
tary servitude, I call it the “free labor approach.” 
These two methods can be seen in discussions of human traffick-
ing, defined broadly to be roughly equivalent to “the new slavery.”12  
9 Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18. 
10 Cf. Archibald Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574, 576-
77 (1951) (applying this approach to the question whether the Amendment protects 
the right to strike).  This point is discussed at length in James Gray Pope, Contract, 
Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE 
L.J. 1474, 1516-20 (2010).    
11 Shaw v. Fisher, 113 S.C. 287, 292 (1920) (invalidating, on Thirteenth Amend-
ment grounds, the tort of employing a laborer who was under contract to another em-
ployer); Pope, supra note 10, at 1531-33.     
12 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 15 (2009) (rejecting de-
finitions that limit “trafficking” to international movement and concluding that “in 
essence, [it] is a modern-day form of slavery” that “involves exploitation and forced 
servitude”).  Despite the popular association of “trafficking” with international move-
ment, the principal legal definitions encompass the “harboring” or “maintenance” as 
well as the recruitment and transport of a person for purposes of slavery or involuntary 
servitude.  See TVPA § 103(8), 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8) (2006) (defining “severe forms of 
trafficking” to include “harboring . . . a person . . . for the purpose of subjection to in-
voluntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery”); Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing 
the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 
55/25, Annex II, art. 3(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 ( Jan. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Unit-
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Currently, negative approaches predominate.  The United Nations 
Protocol, for example, calls on member states to criminalize “trafficking 
in persons” and to provide protection and assistance to victims of that 
practice.13  Similarly, the TVPA prohibits various forms of trafficking, 
strengthens previously enacted statutes criminalizing peonage, slavery, 
and involuntary servitude, provides protections for victims of “severe 
forms of trafficking,” and contains provisions designed to encourage 
other nations to prohibit and punish severe forms of trafficking.14 
Some analysts, however, have proposed adding a positive compo-
nent to the negative attack.  Kevin Bales, who generally stresses the 
distinctive evil of slavery, nevertheless joins with Ron Soodalter in 
proposing that the protections of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) (which guarantees the rights to organize and engage in con-
certed activities) be extended to all American agricultural and domes-
tic workers on the ground that “otherwise, as recent history has 
shown, they will continue to be more susceptible to enslavement than 
other workers in America.”15  Jennifer Chacón goes further, suggesting 
that “[m]any instances of trafficking could be effectively addressed 
through three simple steps,” the first of which is to “allow all workers 
to seek remedies under Commerce Clause–based and Thirteenth 
Amendment–based laws.”16 
ed Nations Protocol] (defining “trafficking in persons” to include “harbouring” of per-
sons by specified means for purposes of exploitation); Anne T. Gallagher, Human 
Rights and Human Trafficking:  Quagmire or Firm Ground?  A Response to James Hathaway, 
49 VA. J. INT’L L. 789, 814 (2009) (observing that the United Nations Protocol defines 
trafficking to include “both the bringing of a person into exploitation as well as the 
maintenance of that person in a situation of exploitation” for purposes of the re-
quirement of national criminalization).  For a definition of “the new slavery,” see infra 
notes 17-19 and accompanying text.  
13 United Nations Protocol, supra note 12, at arts. 5-8.  The status of the Protocol 
as a supplement to the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime highlights 
the centrality of criminal prohibition. 
14 TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified in scattered sections 
of 18 and 22 U.S.C.). 
15 KEVIN BALES & RON SOODALTER, THE SLAVE NEXT DOOR:  HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
AND SLAVERY IN AMERICA TODAY 263 (2009).  Agricultural laborers and domestic work-
ers are currently excluded from the Act’s protections.  See National Labor Relations 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). 
16 Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia:  Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to 
Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 3024 (2006); see also Benjamin I. 
Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 (2008) (explaining how 
undocumented workers and other vulnerable, low-wage workers can utilize the Fair 
Labor Standards Act and other labor laws to foster self-organization and resist un-
trammeled employer domination). 
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The purpose of this Article is to focus attention on the potential 
role of the free labor approach in the struggle against human traffick-
ing.  It attempts to draw out the systemic logic of proposals that, like 
Chacón’s and Bales and Soodalter’s, supplement the prohibition of 
slavery with support for selected labor rights.  Part I discusses some 
strengths and limitations of the prohibition approach.  Part II sets 
forth corresponding limitations and strengths of the free labor ap-
proach.  Part III applies the free labor approach to the problem of 
immigration as it relates to slavery.  Part IV explores the problem of 
sex trafficking from a free labor perspective.  
I.  STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE PROHIBITION APPROACH 
Bales and Soodalter define slavery as consisting of three elements:  
(1) “the complete control of one person by another, through the use 
of violence—both physical and psychological”; (2) “hard labor for lit-
tle or no pay”; and (3) “economic exploitation—making a profit for 
the slaveholder.”17  It is the first of these elements that separates sla-
very from other forms of labor exploitation:  “All three . . . are vital to 
the definition, but the most crucial is violent control and the resultant 
loss of free will.  When we aren’t sure if someone is, in fact, a slave, we 
can ask one basic question:  ‘Can this person walk away?’”18  The U.S. 
and international legal definitions of trafficking are more complex, 
but they incorporate this emphasis on loss of free will.19 
17 BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 15, at 13. 
18 Id. 
19 The U.N. Protocol seeks to eliminate “trafficking in persons,” which is defined as  
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of 
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiv-
ing of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over anoth-
er person, for the purpose of exploitation.  Exploitation shall include, at a min-
imum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude 
or the removal of organs. 
United Nations Protocol, supra note 12, art. 3(a) (emphasis added).  The TVPA focus-
es on “severe forms of trafficking in persons,” which is defined to include  
(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or 
coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 
18 years of age; or (B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, 
or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or 
coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bon-
dage, or slavery.  
TVPA § 103(8), 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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This definition is well suited to separate out a set of practices for 
moral condemnation and prohibition.  In the global economy, hun-
dreds of millions of workers engage in hard labor for little or no pay 
and are objects of economic exploitation, thus meeting the second 
and third criteria of Bales and Soodalter’s definition.  But there is no 
consensus that economic exploitation is a moral wrong (as opposed to 
a fact of life in a world economy characterized by scarcity) or that em-
ployers (as opposed to structural forces beyond their control) are to 
blame.  By contrast, almost everyone agrees both that labor coerced by 
physical or psychological violence is a moral evil and that the people 
who deploy the violence or knowingly assist in or benefit from the vi-
olence are morally blameworthy. 
With this definition of slavery and trafficking, the prohibition ap-
proach has a number of important political advantages.  Its three-step 
sequence—(1) define the unwanted activity,(2) punish the perpetra-
tors, and (3) assist the victims—is easily understood.  The sharp line 
between trafficking (or slavery) and other, less egregious forms of la-
bor exploitation, like failure to pay wages or violations of health and 
safety regulations, fits the moral fervor of the antitrafficking cam-
paign.  Trafficking is an unambiguous moral evil, traffickers are “bad 
people” who deserve severe punishment, and trafficking victims clear-
ly merit our sympathy.  The moral depravity of the perpetrators and 
the heart-wrenching misery of the victims make it possible for activists 
to shock and shame politicians, media figures, and ordinary people 
into action.  Not only does the focus on “trafficking” or “slavery” facili-
tate the mobilization of supporters, but it also tends to neutralize or 
isolate potential opposition.  It carves out a marginal form of labor 
exploitation that is not vital to the power or prosperity of any impor-
tant economic or political elite.  Trafficking is already illegal (at least 
on paper) in every country of the world.  It has no public defenders.  
In sharp contrast to nineteenth-century chattel slavery, it does not 
predominate in a single important legal industry or nation.20 
However, the same features of the prohibition approach that 
make it so attractive also limit its effectiveness in at least three ways.  
First, the search for morally blameworthy perpetrators does not neces-
sarily lead to the heart of the new slavery.  The moral clarity of the 
“slavery” definition in the realm of theory is not matched by legal or 
economic clarity on the ground.  Unlike nineteenth-century chattel 
20 See KEVIN BALES, ZOE TRODD & ALEX KENT WILLIAMSON, MODERN SLAVERY:  THE 
SECRET WORLD OF 27 MILLION PEOPLE 146 (2009). 
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slavery, the new slavery is not a distinct system of labor exploitation.  
Rather, it consists in the addition of physical or psychological violence 
to an underlying capitalist labor market.  As Bales and Soodalter point 
out, it is “capitalism at its worst.”21  The new slavery typically exists 
alongside other practices of labor exploitation that do not involve vi-
olence sufficiently immediate or intense to amount to slavery.  Slave 
and nonslave laborers toil in close proximity, for example, in U.S. 
agriculture and domestic service, in the Brazilian charcoal industry, 
and in Pakistani brick manufacturing.22  The same drive for cheap la-
bor that pushes many employers to violate protective legislation like 
minimum-wage laws and health-and-safety laws, can—extended one 
step further—lead to slavery.  As one activist put it, slavery is “at the 
end of a spectrum of labor violations.”23 
How many beatings does it take before a wage laborer is trans-
formed into a slave?  And how can “psychological coercion” be de-
fined in a way that takes into account the vulnerabilities of particular 
workers while simultaneously providing a standard of guilt clear 
enough to put employers on notice as to potential criminal liability?24  
Judges routinely deal with difficult borderline questions like these, but 
legal resolutions cannot impose moral clarity on a muddy reality.  The 
moral horror of slavery—so useful in mobilizing opposition—can be 
an obstacle when juries are asked to convict otherwise respectable 
business people of slavery on the basis of a definition that hinges on 
matters of degree.25  In the case of United States v. Kozminski, concerns 
about the need for clear notice of criminal liability led the U.S. Su-
preme Court to narrow the statutory ban on “involuntary servitude” to 
21 BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 15, at 6.  
22 Id. at 13; KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE:  NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 140, 165 (rev. ed. 2004).   
23 BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 15, at 54 (quoting Laura Germino, member of 
the Coalition of Immokalee Workers).  As Bales and Soodalter observe,  “When the 
philosophy is ‘The less you pay, the more you make,’ the ultimate objective is to pay 
nothing.  And what better way to achieve this goal than to enslave the workforce?”  Id.  
See also Dina Francesca Haynes, Exploitation Nation:  The Thin and Grey Legal Lines Be-
tween Trafficked Persons and Abused Migrant Laborers, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 48-50 (2009) (presenting examples to show the difficulty of differentiating 
trafficking from other forms of labor exploitation). 
24 For a revealing discussion of the line-drawing difficulties, see Kathleen Kim, Psy-
chological Coercion in the Context of Modern-Day Involuntary Labor:  Revisiting United States 
v. Kozminski and Understanding Human Trafficking, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 941, 972 (2007). 
25 See Chacón, supra note 16, at 3035 (“[P]rosecutors may be reluctant to attach 
the harsh penalties and high stigma of the TVPA to all but the most unpopular and 
politically powerless offenders.”). 
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physical or legal coercion, excluding psychological coercion.26  The 
TVPA subsequently broadened the definition, but it remains unclear 
whether prosecutors and courts will overcome their initial reluctance 
to go beyond the relatively bright line of physical and legal coercion.27 
Even after lawmakers have determined that a particular set of 
practices amounts to slavery, it may be difficult to ascertain who can 
be held responsible for this conduct.  In place of the proud slave mas-
ters of yore, we now have layers of small-time labor procurers and con-
tractors (sometimes with colorful labels like “gatos” and “coyotes”) 
who work for what appear to be respectable business people who, in 
turn, work for others in a chain that often leads to multinational cor-
porations.28  The people at the bottom do the actual enslaving; they 
are clearly culpable, but also easily replaced.  The people at the top, 
who have the power to end the practice, often lack provable culpabili-
ty.29  Unlike the nineteenth-century planter, who consciously and 
openly chose to employ slave labor, the corporations that buy the 
products of slave labor merely extend ordinary market logic one step 
further:  “Why pay $20 an hour for a factory worker in Europe when 
one will work for $1 an hour or less in India?  Why buy sugar from 
U.S. farmers when it is much cheaper from the Dominican Republic 
(where enslaved Haitians do the harvesting)?”30  Compounding these 
problems, present-day slaveholders deploy a variety of tactics to cover 
their tracks.  They hide slavery behind apparently valid labor con-
tracts, share profits and services with law enforcement officers, and 
manipulate slaves to develop feelings of loyalty toward their masters.  
Enslaved individuals often deny or acquiesce in their slavery, and 
many are reluctant to testify against their masters.31 
This brings us to the second limitation of the prohibition ap-
proach.  Although these obstacles can—at least in theory—be over-
come within a prohibition framework, the costs are steep.  It takes 
26 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988). 
27 See Kim, supra note 24, at 970-71 (“Absent specific guidance, difficulties in eva-
luating coercion persist at the investigation and enforcement level of the TVPA’s im-
plementation, which may be resulting in the under-enforcement of psychologically in-
duced trafficking crimes.”). 
28 See, e.g., BALES, supra note 22, at 142-43, 236; see also Tobias Barrington Wolff, 
The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 
986-92 (2002) (reporting examples of American corporate involvement in slavery).  
29 BALES, supra note 22, at 237.  
30 Id. at 236. 
31 For examples from Thailand, Mauritania, and Brazil, see id. at 62-63, 84-85, 
106-07, and 137-38. 
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time, money, and energy for prosecutors to penetrate slaveholders’ 
deceptions.  In many cases, prosecutors must work carefully with re-
luctant victims in order to secure their testimony.  As a result, traffick-
ing cases require considerably greater resources than most other crim-
inal prosecutions.32  Moreover, trafficking prosecutions often entail 
collateral damage to human rights.  Examples include detention of 
trafficking victims, prosecution of victims for immigration violations, 
expulsion of victims who face reprisals in their home countries, “crack 
downs” that trample the rights of suspects and bystanders, and unfair 
trials of accused individuals.33 
These difficulties pose a test of commitment for proponents of the 
prohibition approach.  One could simply dig in and push for more re-
sources, both for the primary purpose of ending trafficking and for 
the secondary purpose of minimizing human rights externalities.  But 
the marginal benefits from each dollar spent can be expected to de-
cline.  In the United States, for example, prosecutors reject a high 
proportion of potential trafficking cases based on weak evidence, an-
ticipated difficulties in proving criminal intent, problems with wit-
nesses, and the low deterrent value of the case.34  If antitraffickers per-
suade them to take more, we can expect that each new prosecution 
will tend to be a little less cost effective than the last.  The necessary 
commitment of resources will increase, as will the temptation to take 
shortcuts around the rights of victims and suspects.  At some point, 
the question arises as to whether resources might be better spent on 
another approach to the problem. 
Finally, and more fundamentally, the prohibition approach—by 
itself—does nothing to ensure that freed slaves have somewhere to go.  
Consider Bales’s case study of Mauritania, where slavery was formally 
abolished in 1980 but nevertheless lives on today.35  Many slaves de-
cline to escape because jobs are scarce, employers tend to refrain 
from hiring the allegedly emancipated slaves, and a full complement 
32 BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 15, at 246; see also Free the Slaves et al., Hidden 
Slaves:  Forced Labor in the United States, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 47, 64 (2005) (quoting a 
U.S. Department of Labor spokesperson as saying, “These cases take a lot of resources 
to get the evidence needed to try perpetrators.  And when we do have a criminal case, 
we lose an investigator for a long period of time”). 
33 Gallagher, supra note 12, at 831. 
34 ANTHONY M. DESTEFANO, THE WAR ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING:  U.S. POLICY AS-
SESSED 133-34 (2007).  
35 BALES, supra note 22, at 81.  Even Anne Gallagher, who defines slavery narrowly, 
agrees that the Mauritanian system amounts to chattel slavery.  Gallagher, supra note 
12, at 810, 815.  
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of beggars already lines the streets.  “Under these conditions, most 
masters do not need to force their slaves to stay.  It is just as easy for 
them to say, ‘Go if you like,’ for they know the slaves have nowhere 
else to go and nothing else to do.”36  Under Bales and Soodalter’s de-
finition of slavery, however, it is not clear that Mauritanian laborers are 
enslaved.  The key defining feature of slavery is “the complete control of 
one person by another, through the use of violence—both physical and 
psychological.”37  Yet, there is no immediate violent penalty for escap-
ing; the Mauritanian laborer is “free” to choose between starvation 
and a life of unpaid labor for a master who treats her as a chattel.  If 
this meets the criterion of violence, it is only because of the back-
ground violence that sustains the system as a whole.38  But if background 
violence is enough, then the criterion of violence does not provide a 
bright-line distinction between slavery and exploitative wage labor.  Even 
a wage worker could be enslaved if, for example, she faced the practical 
alternatives of starvation or total submission to an employer.39 
To summarize, the prohibition approach runs up against three limi-
tations as a strategy for eliminating the new slavery.  First, the focus on 
morally blameworthy perpetrators may direct antislavery efforts toward 
low-level operators, who can easily be replaced, and away from higher-
level beneficiaries of slavery, who have the power to end the practice.  
Second, trafficking prosecutions entail high costs, in both resources and 
human rights externalities—costs that rise as prosecutors move beyond 
the easiest targets.  Third, and finally, the prohibition approach does 
not—by itself—ensure that freed slaves have access to nonservile jobs, 
increasing the danger that they will slip back into slavery. 
II.  STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE FREE LABOR APPROACH 
The strengths and limitations of the free labor approach are 
roughly inverse to those of the prohibition approach.  Consider Kevin 
Bales’s story of a village in northern India where enslaved workers 
toiled in a stone quarry.  Although they enjoyed the formal legal right 
36 BALES, supra note 22, at 87-88. 
37 See BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 15, at 13. 
38 Where labor is sold on the market, it is compelled by violence in the sense that 
property rules, backed by the state’s monopoly of violence, prevent workers from ob-
taining sustenance by means other than selling their labor, such as by farming unused 
land.  See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 
POL. SCI. Q. 470, 472-73 (1923). 
39 See Shaw v. Fisher, 102 S.E. 325, 327-28 (S.C. 1920); infra text accompanying 
note 92. 
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to quit and walk away, they were held to the quarry by the threat of vi-
olence and the absence of any wage-labor jobs in the impoverished 
area.40  Workers from Sankalp, an antislavery organization, visited the 
villagers and alerted them to the fact that they were not without rights 
under the law.  With this encouragement, the villagers conceived the 
idea of obtaining a mining lease and working for themselves.  Though 
illiterate and poverty-stricken, they were experts at operating a quarry.  
After weathering violent retaliation, eviction from the quarry, and 
months of surviving on weeds and roots, they were granted a lease.  
Soon, they were working their new quarry at a level of productivity 
and profit unheard of under the slave system.  Impressed with this 
success, Sankalp workers spread the idea to other slave villages.41 
This story illustrates three strengths of the free labor approach, 
each of which corresponds to a limitation of the prohibition ap-
proach.  First, the free labor approach does not insist that morally 
blameworthy individuals be identified and punished.  Instead, it fo-
cuses first on the workers, seeking to provide them with the rights ne-
cessary to secure their economic independence or, failing that, to 
supply the “power below” to give employers the “incentive above” to 
provide nonservile employment.  Second, the free labor approach re-
lies not primarily on government money and enforcement, but on 
worker self-activity.  Where the conditions for a free labor approach 
are present, a relatively small infusion of resources can enable workers 
to win and keep their own freedom.  For example, a grant of $3000 
enabled Sankalp to purchase motorcycles for three of its workers, 
doubling the number of villages they could reach.42  Finally, the free 
labor approach centers on the creation and sustenance of an alterna-
tive to slavery; workers must enjoy not only the right to walk away from 
their employers, but also all rights that are essential to participation in 
the free labor system.  In the case of the quarry workers, Indian law—
which failed utterly to protect the villagers against slaveholder vi-
olence—nevertheless gave them access to the mining lease despite 
their status as Kols, a group low in the Indian caste and ethnic hie-
rarchy.  Armed with the hope of obtaining their own quarry, the vil-
lagers were able to survive retaliation without government assistance. 
These strengths of the free labor approach carry with them a dan-
ger, namely, that the goal of free labor could dilute the focus of the 
40 KEVIN BALES, ENDING SLAVERY:  HOW WE FREE TODAY’S SLAVES 63-64 (2007). 
41 Id. at 64-68. 
42 Id. at 56. 
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movement, sacrificing moral clarity and risking defections by allies 
who support the elimination of violent enslavement but are opposed 
or undecided about free labor rights and practices.  Consider the case 
of Domestic Workers United (DWU), an organization of American 
domestic workers.  In the spring of 2009, DWU held a rally in New 
York’s Central Park to push for a New York State “Domestic Workers 
Bill of Rights.”43  The rally brought together women who had expe-
rienced a wide variety of labor violations including subminimum wag-
es, outright wage theft, sexual harassment, psychological abuse, physi-
cal assaults, and even enslavement.44  This graduated spectrum of 
abuses is characteristic of the problems faced by domestic workers in 
the United States.  In a survey of 240 domestic workers in the San 
Francisco area, 90% reported not receiving time and a half for over-
time work, 16% reported wage theft, 9% reported sexual harassment, 
and 9% reported physical violence.45  The domestic-workers move-
ment, which includes DWU and a number of similar organizations 
spread across the country, addresses all of these concerns.  The New 
York State Assembly has passed a DWU-supported bill that provides 
for overtime pay, a weekly day of rest, and protection for the rights to 
organize and bargain collectively.  DWU and other groups have as-
sisted domestic workers in lawsuits over issues ranging from wage and 
hour infractions to involuntary servitude.  Employers who underpay or 
abuse domestic workers may awaken to find lively crowds of workers 
and supporters protesting outside their homes.46 
If the goal is to end slavery, what is the best approach to the broad 
set of workers’ rights demands pressed by organizations like DWU?  At 
least three possibilities come to mind:  (1) decline to support any 
43 Lizzy Ratner, The New Domestic Order, THE NATION, Sept. 28, 2009, at 13, 13. 
44 Id. at 13-14. 
45 MUJERES UNIDAS Y ACTIVAS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS:  WORKING CONDI-
TIONS OF CALIFORNIA HOUSEHOLD WORKERS 5 (2007).  The authors suggest that the 
rate of abuse might have been underreported:  “More than one-third (35%) of workers 
did not respond to survey questions about workplace abuse, a substantially higher non-
response rate than the rest of the survey that indicates a high level of discomfort with 
the questions (corroborated with survey collectors).”  Id. at 5; see also Mary Romero, 
Nanny Diaries and Other Stories:  Imagining Immigrant Women’s Labor in the Social Reproduc-
tion of American Families, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 809, 843-44 (2003) (listing abuses endured 
by domestic workers, including low wages, long hours, lack of privacy, restrictions on 
movement and communication with outsiders, passport confiscation, threats of depor-
tation, assault and battery, sexual assault, servitude, and torture). 
46 See Evelyn Nieves, Domestic Workers Sue, Lobby, Organize for Workplace Rights, ASSO-
CIATED PRESS, June 4, 2008, available at LEXIS; Ratner, supra note 43, at 13-15; Elissa 
Strauss, The Invisible Workers, AM. PROSPECT, June 2009, at 24, 24-26. 
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workers’ rights (other than the negative right to be free from slavery) 
in order to keep the focus on the distinctive evil of slavery; (2) include 
the full set of free labor demands in the antislavery program in the 
hope that efforts to enforce them will result in the freeing of slaves; 
and (3) selectively include demands that are closely related to the li-
beration of slaves. 
As the reader might guess, this set of alternatives harks back to the 
three bowls of porridge in the story of Goldilocks.  The first is too 
pure; as will become apparent below, experience suggests that the 
combination of support for workers’ rights with antislavery prohibi-
tion can be far more effective than an exclusive reliance on prohibi-
tion.  The second is obviously too diffuse; the antislavery movement 
would lose its focus altogether if it added all workers’ rights to the 
program.  The third is, unsurprisingly, just right; it holds the potential 
to realize synergies with workers’ rights while maintaining the focus 
on slavery.  Unfortunately, the third also leaves open more questions 
than it resolves.  How many workers’ rights should be supported, and 
what kind?  This Article attempts only a preliminary discussion. 
An example of the third approach can be found in the work of 
Kevin Bales.  Generally, Bales focuses heavily on defining slavery and 
distinguishing it from other forms of labor extraction.  Slavery “is the 
theft of an entire life,” he explains.47  “It is more closely related to the 
concentration camp than to questions of bad working conditions.”48  
He stresses that antislavery organizations must “focus on slavery” as dis-
tinct from prison labor, nonslave child labor, or “being very poor and 
having few choices.”49  Consistent with the prohibition approach, most 
of his proposals call for the identification, exposure, and punish-
ment—whether by criminal sanctions, adverse political action, private 
disinvestment, or consumer boycotts—of slaveholders and beneficia-
ries of slavery, along with relief for the victims.50 
But Bales does not believe that slavery can be eliminated without 
changing the social and economic conditions that sustain it, namely, 
the ready supply of impoverished, vulnerable victims and the strong 
47 BALES, supra note 22, at 7. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 259; see also Kevin Bales, Preface to JOEL QUIRK, UNFINISHED BUSINESS:  A 
COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY SLAVERY 9, 11 (2008) (warn-
ing against diluting the antislavery appeal by “stretching the meaning of the word ‘sla-
very’ to include such issues as all forms of prostitution, incest, all forms of child labour, 
[and] all prison labour”).   
50 BALES, supra note 22, at 235-51; BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 15, at 253-67. 
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demand for labor at the lowest possible cost.  On the supply side, he 
warns that, “[i]n the long term, wiping out slavery requires helping the 
world’s poor to gain greater control over their lives.”51  And to cool the 
lust for ever-cheaper labor on the demand side, “we must convince the 
world that human rights need even more protection than property 
rights,” including “priority over the free market in goods.”52 
These observations might appear to put Bales on a slippery slope 
toward diluting the antislavery program with a broad array of anti-
poverty rights.  In terms of specific proposals, however, he avoids this 
problem by focusing on a few rights that have clear synergies with the 
antislavery objective.  In their program for eliminating slavery in the 
United States, for example, Bales and Soodalter single out the rights 
of self-organization and concerted activity and call for them to be ex-
tended to all farm workers and domestic workers.53  Their proposal re-
flects the free labor theory that when workers have rights, they can ex-
ert the “power below” to give employers the “incentive above” to avoid 
slavery and servitude.54 
Consider Bales and Soodalter’s case study of tomato pickers in 
Immokalee, Florida.  The harvesting process is “brutal,” requiring the 
pickers to labor “bent over in the southern sun for hours on end, 
straightening only long enough to run 100 to 150 feet with a filled 
thirty-two-pound bucket and literally throw it up to the worker on the 
truck.”55  Until recently, the pickers risked beatings for the offense of 
pausing to take a drink.  When permitted, they gulped down water out 
of ditches, ingesting pesticides and fertilizer along with the water.  
The work day dragged on until the crew chief decided it was over.  
Then the pickers returned to overcrowded quarters in “broken-down 
trailers, enclaves of tiny huts, and depressing little apartments.”56  For 
their labor, the pickers received a fraction of the minimum wage to 
which they were legally entitled.57  Although these workers led a hard 
life, they were lucky compared to another group of pickers—those 
who had fallen into debt bondage.  These workers had become in-
51 BALES, supra note 22, at 235. 
52 Id. at 249. 
53 BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 15, at 262-63. 
54 The quoted language is from Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944).  I have sug-
gested elsewhere that workers enjoy the constitutional rights to organize and strike under 
Pollock, a conclusion that conflicts with the results in numerous cases but has never been 
considered on the merits by the U.S. Supreme Court.  See Pope, supra note 10, at 1540-65.  
55 BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 15, at 45. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 45-46. 
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debted to smugglers known as “coyotes,” who helped them cross the 
border into the United States.58  Once in Florida, the coyote would sell 
the worker to a labor contractor, and the worker would owe the con-
tractor.  But the contractors charged for living expenses and, no matter 
how hard a worker toiled, his debt would grow.59  Any thoughts of escape 
would be squelched with threats of violence, both to the worker himself 
and to his family back home.60  The net result of this system is enslave-
ment; the worker labors without compensation or hope of escape. 
In 1993, a group of low-wage laborers formed the Coalition of 
Immokalee Workers (CIW) as a vehicle to improve conditions and 
compensation.61  The CIW is a textbook example of the free labor ap-
proach in action.  Instead of relying primarily on government en-
forcement, the CIW brings workers together, develops rights con-
sciousness through education and action, and creates the space for 
workers to develop strategies for improving their conditions.  After a 
series of discussions among the 80 to 100 most active workers, the CIW 
decided to launch a boycott of the Taco Bell chain—a subsidiary of 
Yum! Brands, the world’s largest restaurant corporation—demanding 
that the chain pay one cent more per pound of tomatoes with the 
proceeds going to raise wages.62  The notion that a group of immi-
grant workers could successfully pressure such a large, multinational 
corporation might appear quixotic.  But the CIW activists did not be-
lieve that the local labor contractors could significantly improve con-
ditions as long as big buyers like Taco Bell continued to demand the 
lowest possible prices.  It seemed that the alternatives were to give up 
or take a long-odds gamble.  Over the next four years, the CIW en-
listed a broad range of allies among labor, students, and faith-based 
groups to support the consumer boycott and other pressure tactics in-
cluding a hunger strike.  The gamble eventually paid off in 2005, 
when Yum! Brands agreed to the CIW’s demands.63 
As Immokalee’s tomato pickers organized, their emerging system 
of free agricultural labor began to function as a nemesis of slavery.  In 
sharp contrast to most low-wage immigrant workers, the CIW’s 3000 
58 Id. at 51. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 52. 
61 Elly Leary, Florida Farmworkers Chop Up Burger King, MONTHLY REV., May 2008, at 
5, 5. 
62 Elly Leary, Immokalee Workers Take Down Taco Bell, MONTHLY REV., Oct. 2005, at 
11, 11. 
63 Id.  
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members have learned about labor rights and experienced the bene-
fits of organization.  These members are, in the words of a CIW activ-
ist, “well-placed to understand, analyze, investigate, and operate within 
the parallel and totally separate world that captive workers and their 
employers inhabit in rural agricultural communities.”64  The truth of 
this observation has been demonstrated by the CIW’s repeated success 
at spotting agricultural slavery and assisting workers in bringing the 
perpetrators to justice.65  But CIW members do not see legal action as 
a solution.  No matter how many trafficking cases are won, new ones 
will arise as long as big food buyers like fast-food and megagrocery 
chains (Walmart being a prime example of the latter) continue to 
demand the lowest possible prices from suppliers.  Accordingly, the 
CIW’s goal is to persuade the big buyers “to take responsibility and say, 
‘We are no longer going to tolerate sweatshop conditions and sla-
very.’”66  In the Yum! Brands settlement, for example, the company 
agreed not only to pay the extra penny per pound, but also to cease 
buying tomatoes that had been harvested by workers in a condition of 
involuntary servitude.67  Since then, the CIW has reached similar 
agreements with McDonald’s, Burger King, Whole Foods, and Subway.68 
Like the prohibition approach, the free labor approach poses tests 
of commitment for its supporters.  If worker organization is to serve as 
a nemesis of slavery, for example, then workers who are threatened by 
slavery or in close proximity to it must enjoy rights that are effective in 
practice, and not merely promises on paper.  The rights to organize 
and strike are formally recognized in all of the first-wave industrialized 
nations and protected in international law as fundamental human 
rights.69  But formal protection will not be enough.  In the case of the 
CIW, for example, coverage under the NLRA might or might not im-
prove the situation of the tomato pickers.  The workers would gain 
statutory protection for their rights to organize and to bargain collec-
tively—the reason why Bales and Soodalter endorsed this reform.  But 
the value of that protection is open to question.  To begin with, em-
ployers who violate the NLRA rights of undocumented workers face 
64 BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 15, at 59. 
65 Id. at 54-60. 
66 Id. at 61 (quoting CIW member Laura Germino). 
67 Id. at 62. 
68 Id. at 62-65. 
69 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE:  WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSO-
CIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 13-
14 (2000); TONIA NOVITZ, INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT 
TO STRIKE, at General Editors’ Preface (2003).  
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no penalty other than posting a piece of paper promising not to do it 
again; the workers get nothing.70  Even the standard remedies of the 
Act, which include reinstatement and back pay, are too weak and too 
slow to provide employers with an effective incentive to respect the 
statutory rights of their employees.71  Worse yet, the NLRA bans the 
CIW’s most effective tactic:  the secondary boycott.  Under section 
8(b)(4), it is illegal for a “labor organization” to seek changes in the 
labor policies of one employer (e.g., the farm labor contractors who 
make the immediate decision between wage and slave labor) by boy-
cotting another (e.g., Yum! Brands or McDonald’s).  Although large-
scale buyers often exercise effective control over labor conditions by 
choosing the lowest-cost contractors regardless of labor conditions, 
the law insists that the contractor (termed the “primary” employer be-
cause it hires and pays the workers) is the only acceptable target for 
labor pressure while the buyer is an innocent “neutral.”72  Each of 
these limitations—the exclusion of undocumented workers from re-
medies, the delay-prone and weak remedies accorded to documented 
workers, and the flat ban on secondary boycotts—falls below the stan-
dards set by the International Labor Organization (ILO).73   
70 Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152-53 (2002).  As a result, 
employers have no incentive to respect the rights of undocumented workers and every 
incentive to hire them as an effectively rights-less class of workers vulnerable to exploi-
tation at will.  See id. at 154 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, J J., dis-
senting); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions:  Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds, the New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court’s Role in Making Federal Labor Poli-
cy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (2003); Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected 
World:  Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 737, 753-54 (2003); Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers’ Rights in a Post-
Hoffman World—Organizing Around the Thirteenth Amendment, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 651, 
658 (2005); see also Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
503, 540 n.125 (2007) (documenting how employers have used Hoffman Plastic “as an 
excuse to squelch labor organizing or efforts to enforce workplace rights”). 
71 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 69, at 9-10, 14.   
72 See BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 15, at 47 (“[T]he buyers—fast food giants 
. . . and market corporations . . . —are dictating the prices they are willing to pay for 
tomatoes and other crops.”); JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS:  THE FIGHT 
FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 57-58 (2005); KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DI-
GITS:  EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 209-12 (2004).  The 
NLRA does permit unions to utilize nonpicketing forms of communication to request 
that consumers boycott secondary employers.  Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf 
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 580 (1988). 
73 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 69, at 41-42, 23 (reporting that the U.S. is 
obligated to ensure “that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized 
are violated shall have an effective remedy,” but that recourse under the NLRA “is of-
ten delayed to a point where it ceases to provide redress,” and that “remedies are weak 
and often ineffective”); id. at 210 (“The U.S. prohibition on solidarity action . . . runs 
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From an antislavery perspective, then, it might be worthwhile to 
support effective rights of association for low-wage workers who are 
especially vulnerable to slavery.  Strong resistance can be expected 
from the many governments that seek to attract corporate investment 
by offering an undemanding and submissive workforce.74  Given the 
current weakness of global human rights agencies like the ILO, 
progress may come first at the local and national levels.75  Locally, so-
cial movements might deploy the freedom of association in antitraffick-
ing initiatives.  In the United States, for example, trafficked guest work-
ers have organized an association with assistance from the New Orleans 
Workers Center for Racial Justice.  A number of these workers recently 
obtained T visas (which are available to certain victims of “severe traf-
ficking”) after arguing that denial of the rights to organize and strike, 
combined with the H-2A guest visa’s ban on changing employers, con-
stitutes involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution.76  At the national level, the Supreme Court of Cana-
da recently held that the Canadian Constitution provides “at the least 
the same level of protection” for the right to bargain collectively as do 
the standards of the ILO.77  A case involving the extension of this right 
to low-wage agricultural workers is currently before the court.78   
counter to principles developed by the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association 
over many decades of treating cases under convention 87 and 98.”); Ellen Dannin, 
Hoffman Plastics as Labor Law—Equality at Last for Immigrant Workers?, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 
393, 443 (2010) (reporting the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association’s finding 
“that eliminating the back pay remedy [for undocumented workers] left the U.S. gov-
ernment with insufficient means for ensuring that undocumented workers are pro-
tected from anti-union discrimination,” and providing documentation).  
74 Alan Hyde, The International Labor Organization in the Stag Hunt for Global Labor 
Rights, 3 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 153, 170 (2009) (observing that the freedom of as-
sociation “requires special means of enforcement, because a country or region may 
indeed realize comparative advantage by repressing unions and collective bargaining,” 
and its “tame or absent unions may well figure in its pitches to foreign investors”); Ke-
vin Kolben, The New Politics of Linkage:  India’s Opposition to the Workers’ Rights Clause, 13 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 225 (2006) (explaining why India and many other devel-
oping countries are reluctant to recognize the freedom of association). 
75 Hyde, supra note 74, at 170.  Hyde suggests, however, that regional subassem-
blies or small groups of nations at similar stages of development might succeed in 
enacting enforceable labor standards.  Id. at 177. 
76 Letter from Jennifer Rosenbaum, New Orleans Workers’ Ctr. for Racial Justice, 
to Thomas Pearl, Victims and Trafficking Unit, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 1, 
2010) (on file with author).   
77 Health Servs. & Support—Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass’n v. British Co-
lumbia, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, ¶ 79 (Can.).   
78 Judy Fudge, Brave New Words:  Labour, the Courts and the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, 28 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 7), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1522545.   
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III.  A FREE LABOR APPROACH TO IMMIGRATION AND  
CROSS-BORDER TRAFFICKING 
Perhaps the biggest single supporting factor for the new slavery may 
be found in the partial and discriminatory globalization of economic 
activity.  With impressive unanimity, the financial and political elites of 
the first-wave industrialized countries tout the benefits of transnational 
“free trade.”  The GATT, NAFTA, and other international trade re-
gimes protect the rights of corporations to move capital and commodi-
ties across national borders unimpeded by governments, democratic or 
otherwise.  But there is one factor of production that elites are content 
to wall away inside national borders:  labor.  “Now capital has wings,” 
observes New York financier Robert A. Johnson.  “Capital can deal with 
twenty labor markets at once and pick and choose among them.  Labor 
is fixed in one place.  So power has shifted.”79 
In this regime of mobile capital and trapped labor, impoverished 
workers predictably and desperately seek entry to countries with job 
opportunities.  Immigration law inevitably serves as a form of labor 
control, theoretically walling workers off from jobs while actually 
creating an undocumented workforce of vast proportions.80  As of 
2008, for example, there were approximately 11.6 million unautho-
rized immigrants living in the United States.81  Labor force participa-
tion rates are high, and as many as one in five cooks, one in four con-
struction workers, and one in two farm workers in the United States 
are undocumented.82  Although only a small proportion of undocu-
mented workers are actually enslaved, the overwhelming majority are 
effectively denied important workers’ rights, and thus lack full access 
to the system of free labor.  As we have seen, domestic and agricultural 
workers—occupations with high proportions of undocumented work-
79 WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT:  THE MANIC LOGIC OF GLOBAL 
CAPITALISM 24 (1997). 
80 See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446, 
1447 (2008) (observing that a strong immigration reform law could “reasonably be 
characterized as the most significant labor reform in a generation”).  See generally Juliet 
Stumpf & Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through Immigration Law:  One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2002) (documenting the 
use of immigration restrictions as a means of regulating the domestic labor pool in the 
United States). 
81 MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION 
STATISTICS, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN 
THE UNITED STATES:  JANUARY 2008, at 2 (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2008.pdf. 
82 Gordon, supra note 70, at 529. 
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ers—are excluded from the NLRA.83  Even those who toil in covered 
occupations are deprived of any effective remedy under the Hoffman 
Plastic decision.84  More fundamentally, undocumented workers are 
constantly haunted by the possibility of deportation, rendering them 
reluctant to enforce even rights guarantees that do, at least on the 
books, apply to them.  These vulnerabilities are compounded by cul-
tural isolation, unfamiliarity with American rights, and fear of employer 
retaliation against family members in their home country.85  As a result, 
undocumented workers are attractive candidates for recruitment into 
the large and growing informal, or “underground,” labor market that 
exists alongside the formal, regulated labor market.86  Employers prize 
them as employees not only because their labor is cheap, but also be-
cause their vulnerability makes them pliable and subservient.87 
The net result of all of this is a global economy without even the 
pretense of a global free labor system.  For the antislavery cause, this is 
a disaster.  It walls off the poverty-stricken workers of source countries, 
rendering them vulnerable to traffickers, while creating substantial 
populations of undocumented workers in destination countries.  
These effectively rights-less workers provide both a recruitment pool 
for enslavers and a largely silent buffer zone around slavery.88 
The antislavery movement cannot, of course, singlehandedly 
bring a global free labor system into being.  However, it can—at a 
minimum—avoid helping to delay the necessary reforms.  In particu-
lar, it might be counterproductive to emphasize border control as a 
response to transnational trafficking.  Reliance on border enforce-
ment tends to spill over into broader enforcement against “human 
smuggling,” which, from the viewpoint of many smuggled workers, is a 
83 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
84 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
85 See QUIRK, supra note 49, at 55 (noting that employers in formal labor markets 
use isolation from an immigrant’s place of origin and language barriers, among other 
things, to exploit such individuals); see also Romero, supra note 45, at 843-44. 
86 See IMMANUEL NESS, IMMIGRANTS, UNIONS, AND THE NEW U.S. LABOR MARKET 
20-23, 26-27 (2005) (arguing that the decline of manufacturing and later rise in the 
services sector has dispersed work to small firms competing on the basis of cheap la-
bor, resulting in an informal and unregulated economy); QUIRK, supra note 49, at 55 
(“Unable to seek lawful employment, migrants gravitate towards informal labour mar-
kets, which offer fertile ground for many forms of exploitation . . . .”). 
87 See Gordon, supra note 70, at 548 (observing that the preference for cheap labor 
“may run second to an employer’s desire for subservient workers,” and recounting ex-
amples of employer strategies for obtaining workers viewed as subservient).  
88 See QUIRK, supra note 49, at 55 (illustrating how circumstances of cultural isolation 
dramatically decrease a laborer’s ability to escape even violent working conditions). 
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deeply flawed but essential method of adjusting to the global economy.89  
Workers are merely following the lead of economic and political elites, 
who insist upon unimpeded international mobility for their factors of 
production.  Some antitraffickers acknowledge this problem but point 
out that, realistically, we are stuck with border control for the time be-
ing.  From a free labor perspective, this sharp separation between ulti-
mate goals and short-range policies is ill-advised.  Tightened border con-
trols tend to raise the cost of migration, thereby increasing the 
indebtedness of immigrant workers to labor smugglers and rendering 
them more vulnerable to workers’ rights violations and debt bondage.90  
The inevitable result is to weaken the constituencies that oppose slavery 
while strengthening those that benefit from it, causing the goal of a 
global free labor system to recede further into the distance. 
On a more immediate, practical level, the free labor perspective 
suggests that some guest-worker programs run afoul of bans on invo-
luntary servitude.  In the United States, for example, H-2A and H-2B 
guest-worker visas require that the holder remain with her original 
employer or face deportation.  These workers may not be able to 
prove that they are held in slavery or involuntary servitude, as defined 
under certain statutes, but they are nevertheless deprived of “the right 
to change employers,” which has been recognized by the U.S. Su-
preme Court as an essential feature of the free labor system guaran-
teed by the Thirteenth Amendment.91  This right has been enforced 
even where the laborer involved was apparently free to move outside 
the jurisdiction.  In Shaw v. Fisher, for example, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court struck down the tort of hiring a laborer who was un-
der a contractual obligation to work for another, though there was no 
finding that the laborer could not have left the state.92  It would seem 
89 See Chacón, supra note 16, at 2985-87 (distinguishing trafficking and smug-
gling); James C. Hathaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of “Human Trafficking,” 49 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 5 (2008) (“[M]ost smuggling has historically been a consensual and relative-
ly benign market-based response to the existence of laws that seek artificially to con-
strain the marriage of surplus labor supply on one side of the border with unmet de-
mand for certain forms of labor on the other side of that border.”).  
90 See Hathaway, supra note 89, at 33-34 (arguing that criminalization of smuggling 
raises the cost of moving people across borders, which decreases their own funds and 
leaves them more vulnerable to exposure, exploitation, and enslavement). 
91 See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944). 
92 102 S.E. 325, 327-28 (S.C. 1920); see also Thompson v. Box, 112 So. 597, 600 
(Miss. 1927) (“[A] laborer may breach his contract (subject only to civil liability), and 
one may thereafter deal with him as a free man.”). 
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that guest workers must, at a minimum, enjoy the right to change em-
ployers without facing deportation.93 
In the long run, Jennifer Gordon’s concept of transnational labor 
citizenship beckons as a solution consistent with antislavery goals.  She 
proposes that labor citizenship be separated from political citizenship, 
so that trapped labor can be liberated without interfering with the 
power of nation states to define their own political communities.94  
Like political citizenship, labor citizenship would entail both rights 
and duties.  Mexican workers, for example, would gain the right to 
migrate and “work for any employer in the United States with full la-
bor rights and eventual conversion to permanent residence if the mi-
grant so desired.”95  On the other hand, they would also be obligated 
to join transnational labor organizations in both Mexico and the 
United States, and to take a “solidarity oath” pledging to “take no job 
that violated basic workplace laws or that paid less than the minimum 
set by the transnational labor organizations, to report employer viola-
tors to their transnational labor organizations once discovered, and to 
uphold union solidarity with other workers (for example, by refusing 
to cross picket lines).”96  The transnational labor organizations would 
be “grassroots groups” that “might emerge from existing NGOs, work-
er centers, or unions, or might be founded independently.”97  These 
groups would displace the current system of corrupt recruiters in the 
legal sector and smugglers in the underground, informing workers of 
their rights and obligations throughout the process.98  The inspiration 
for Gordon’s proposal came from the existing cross-border network 
formed by the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC), a union 
based in the United States with operations in Mexico.99  As she ac-
knowledges, it is unlikely to be adopted on a wide scale anytime soon, 
but she offers a “micro” version that could go forward without U.S. 
93 See Ruben J. Garcia, Labor as Property:  Guestworkers, International Trade, and the 
Democracy Deficit, 10 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 27, 64 (2006) (“The free labor system 
guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment is at odds with guestworker programs.  The 
ability to quit at any time is illusory if that means that you will be deported.”); Maria L. 
Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment:  Challenging Guest-
worker programs, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 923, 927-29 (2007) (noting the argument that if visa 
workers cannot quit without facing deportation, the result would be involuntary servi-
tude). 
94 Gordon, supra note 70, at 505-06. 
95 Id. at 567. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 568. 
98 Id. at 567-69. 
99 Id. at 574-75. 
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government involvement.100  Such a pilot program, which could in-
volve organizations like the Coalition of Immokalee Workers, might 
be worthy of inclusion in the antislavery program. 
IV.  A FREE LABOR APPROACH TO SEX TRAFFICKING 
The notion of a free labor approach to sex trafficking is, on one 
view, a contradiction in terms.  Catharine MacKinnon, for example, 
contends that the purported distinction between forced and “volunta-
ry” prostitution has “dimensions of unreality”: 
 The point of the distinction is to hive off a narrow definition of force 
in order to define as voluntary the conditions of sex inequality, abuse, 
and destitution that put most women in the sex industry and keep[] 
them there. . . .  [T]o distinguish trafficking from prostitution, as if traf-
ficking by definition is forced and prostitution by definition is free, is to 
obscure that both use money to compel sexual use, that the whole point 
of sex trafficking is to deliver women and children into prostitution, and 
that not crossing a jurisdictional line does not make the unequal equal 
or the forced free.101 
At the outset, it should be clear that MacKinnon’s position leaves 
room for the free labor approach to play a fairly obvious and uncon-
troversial role.  What makes prostitution involuntary, in her view, are 
“the conditions of sex inequality, abuse, and destitution” that push 
women into prostitution.102  Although the free labor approach is no 
substitute for a focused attack on sex inequality, it can assist women in 
achieving economic independence or, failing that, nonservile em-
ployment.  Women have, for example, formed domestic workers’ or-
ganizations to enforce labor rights and defend against sex harassment 
and abuse.103  When Indian quarry villagers managed to obtain and 
operate their own quarry, women who had suffered systematic sexual 
abuse at the hands of slaveholders were propelled into positions of 
leadership in local politics.104  And when a micro-credit program was 
initiated in Bangladesh, women used it more effectively and in greater 
numbers than men.105 
100 Id. at 570-79. 
101 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Trafficking, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 993, 
997-98 (2005). 
102 Id. at 997. 
103 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
104 See BALES, supra note 40, at 69 (discussing the rise and empowerment of women 
in India who had been victims of slavery). 
105 See id. at 221 (describing how women in Bangladesh used microfinancing to 
start small businesses, which ranged from growing herbs to establishing factories). 
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In order to reap the full benefits of a free labor approach, howev-
er, the free labor system must be extended into the industries and lo-
calities where slavery is present.  In the case of the Coalition of Immo-
kalee Workers (CIW), for example, the population of empowered 
members lived and worked in the same kind of rural agricultural com-
munities as the enslaved workers that they helped to liberate.106  It was 
this industrial, geographic, and cultural overlap that made the CIW 
members “well-placed to understand, analyze, investigate, and operate 
within the parallel and totally separate world” of agricultural slavery.107 
There is no reason to think that this dynamic would not operate 
in the sex industry.  Whatever scholars might say about the possibility 
of voluntary prostitution, it is clear that many prostitutes believe and 
act as if there is.  Consider the case of Sarah Schell, who took home 
$600 per day working in a massage parlor.108  On an upper story of the 
same building was a similar operation offering older Asian women for 
a greatly reduced price.109  Sarah used her money to pay for college 
where, among other things, she studied human trafficking.  Gradually, 
she realized that the women upstairs were enslaved.  She went to a lo-
cal antitrafficking group and “let them know that I was friends with 
people in the sex trade and could serve as something of an expert.”110  
In Sarah’s case, college provided the rights education that, in the case 
of the Immokalee tomato pickers, was supplied by the Coalition.  
Whether Sarah’s sex work was “voluntary” or not (clearly not, as it 
turns out, given that she was recruited when still a child), her moral 
agency cannot be doubted.  She acted out of labor and gender soli-
darity:  “I mean if they had to do this kind of work, then at least they 
should be paid for it, as women empowered.”111 
Granted, prostitution may well be an inherently destructive indus-
try that should be eliminated altogether.  There is little doubt that the 
provision of sexual services for money tends to inflict severe injuries 
on the provider.  It has been suggested, for example, that in order to 
survive, prostitutes distance themselves from their own bodies and ex-
periences in ways that are profoundly destructive to the self.112  Even 
106 BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 15, at 59-60. 
107 Id. at 59. 
108 See id. at 174. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 174-75. 
111 Id. at 175. 
112 See KATHLEEN BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY 28-36 (1995) (describ-
ing the stages of dehumanization—specifically distancing, disengagement, dissocia-
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Sarah Schell, who parlayed her $600 per day earnings into a college 
education, was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress syndrome 
and now thinks of herself as a survivor “not of trafficking, but of ex-
ploitation.”113  Further, it is reasonable to assume that in a patriarchal 
world, “prostitution, with or without a woman’s consent,” functions as 
an “institutional, economic, and sexual model for women’s oppres-
sion.”114  At the very least, prostitution brings commodification and 
economic pressure into a realm that should be preserved for auto-
nomous expression.115 
However, the questions whether, when, and how to abolish prosti-
tution involve considerations that go beyond the harmfulness of the 
industry.  Foremost among these, from a free labor perspective, are 
the availability of alternative work and the relative quality of that work 
in terms of economic rewards, dignity, and healthfulness.  If the alter-
natives are worse than prostitution, then an attempt at abolition might 
be premature.  Consistent with this possibility, a number of prostitutes 
and other sex workers have—despite their extraordinary vulnerability 
—courageously organized and struggled to bring workers’ rights into 
the industry.116  Like the CIW in U.S. agriculture, these organizations 
can help to identify and liberate enslaved individuals in the sex indus-
tion, and disembodiment—whereby women dissociate “from their bodies and there-
fore their selves”). 
113 BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 15, at 176. 
114 BARRY, supra note 112, at 24.  Barry says that it is “the” model, but that conten-
tion is not essential to the argument against prostitution.  See also CAROLE PATEMAN, 
THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 207-08 (1988) (arguing that men’s and women’s sexual identi-
ties are at stake in prostitution, and when “women’s bodies are on sale as commodities 
in the capitalist market . . . , men gain public acknowledgment as women’s sexual mas-
ters—that is what is wrong with prostitution”). 
115 See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1921-25 
(1987) (discussing the dehumanization that results from the commodification of sex). 
116 See ANNA-LOUISE CRAGO, OPEN SOC’Y INST., OUR LIVES MATTER:  SEX WORKERS 
UNITE FOR HEALTH AND RIGHTS 8 (2008) (describing the creative methods used by sex 
workers in eight countries to address health and social justice needs); GREGOR GALL, 
SEX WORKER UNION ORGANISING:  AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY 13-14 (2006) (analyzing 
sex worker union organizing in seven first-wave industrialized countries); GLOBAL SEX 
WORKERS:  RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION 167-226 (Kamala Kempadoo & Jo 
Doezema eds., 1998); Kate Hardy, Incorporating Sex Workers into the Argentine Labor 
Movement, 77 INT’L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 89 (2010) (describing the organiza-
tion of sex workers in Argentina); Ashwini Sukthankar, Queering Approaches to Sex, Gend-
er and Labor in India:  Examining Paths to Sex Worker Unionism (2009) (unpublished ma-
nuscript, on file with author) (recounting the development of three sex workers’ 
organizations in India). 
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try.117  Though far from perfect, they provide the best practical oppor-
tunity for sex workers to carve out a space for collective deliberation 
and action.  As one sex worker recounted, 
We never dreamed of speaking up for ourselves.  Never imagined that we 
ever had any rights that we could protect.  But now we are sharing our 
joys and sorrows with each other.  We speak about our rights.  We dare 
to dream about the future.
118
 
MacKinnon’s methodology, if not her conclusions, support this ef-
fort.  Even if women “are what they are made, are determined” by 
male power, the response is not to deny their agency.119  To the con-
trary, MacKinnon holds out the hope that despite being “damaged” 
and suffering “distortion” by male power, women can and “must 
create new conditions, take control of their determinants.”120  Their 
method is group consciousness raising.121  And if it is true that because 
“a woman’s problems are not hers individually but those of women as 
a whole, they cannot be addressed except as a whole,” then sex work-
ers would seem to be an integral part of that project.122  Surely this me-
thod would be violated by selectively spotlighting the antiprostitution 
narratives of some survivors while ignoring the workers’ rights advoca-
cy of others.  In place of the bottom-up method of consciousness rais-
ing, we would have a top-down judgment either that sex worker activ-
ists are victims of false consciousness, or that their self-organization 
should be sacrificed to some greater good.123 
 117 See, e.g., CRAGO, supra note 116, at 14 (“When empowered, sex workers are often the 
best placed and most able to assist trafficked persons and underage minors.”).  
118 Id. at 16 (quoting Hazera Begum, former leader of a Bangladeshi sex worker 
organization). 
119 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 103 (1989). 
120 Id. 
121 See id. at 83-84 (characterizing the feminist method as “consciousness raising,” 
which collectively reconstitutes “the meaning of women’s social experience, as women 
live through it”). 
122 Id. at 95. 
123 Tracy Higgins makes this point with regard to the individual “choice” for sex 
work:  “Whether MacKinnon thinks that women who defend sex work as a viable eco-
nomic choice are deluded (suffering from false consciousness, perhaps) or simply have 
so few choices that this one need not be respected is unclear.  If the former, MacKin-
non does not explain how she identifies the falsely conscious (or worse, collaborating) 
woman.  If the latter, it is not obvious why it is better for women with few choices to have 
their preferred choice eliminated in favor of even more dangerous, difficult, and poorly-
paid work.”  Tracy E. Higgins, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues 
by Catharine Mackinnon, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 523, 540-41 (2006) (book review). 
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CONCLUSION 
Human trafficking and slavery can be attacked not only negatively, 
through legal prohibition, but also positively, by nurturing the free la-
bor system as a nemesis to slavery.  In the realm of law, the free labor 
approach operates by guaranteeing workers a set of rights sufficient to 
achieve either economic independence or, failing that, the power be-
low to give employers the incentive above to provide jobs that rise 
above servitude.  It relies primarily on workers—not government en-
forcement—to achieve and sustain labor freedom.  This approach ap-
pears to provide an indispensable and cost-effective way to move 
beyond the limitations of the predominant prohibition approach. 
 
